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Résumé 
Nous étudions, sur données d’entreprises, si le crédit d’impôt recherche (CIR) en 
accroissement a augmenté le financement privé de la recherche et développement sur la 
décennie 1993-2003. Afin de répondre à cette question, nous utilisons les enquêtes annuelles 
du Ministère de la Recherche, ainsi que les données fiscales individuelles relatives au CIR. La 
question principale est de déterminer si les entreprises auraient quand même augmenté leur 
financement privé en l’absence d’incitation fiscale. Nous utilisons une méthodologie à la 
Rubin. Dans un premier temps, nous étudions les déterminants de la probabilité d’obtention 
du crédit d’impôt recherche, c'est-à-dire le processus de sélection des participants à cette 
mesure. Nous trouvons que la probabilité d’obtention du crédit d’impôt recherche en 
accroissement augmente avec le ratio R&D/Ventes et décroît avec l’obtention de subventions 
à la R&D. Après avoir évalué la probabilité d’obtention du CIR de chaque entreprise nous 
corrigeons les biais de sélection. Dans un second temps, nous évaluons l’effet du CIR en 
accroissement sur le financement privé de la recherche (net de subventions attribuées par 
d’autres sources). Nous trouvons que, globalement, le crédit d’impôt s’ajoute au financement 
privé de la recherche, de sorte qu’un euro de CIR mène à un accroissement d’un peu plus d’un 
Euro de recherche totale. Nous trouvons également que le CIR en accroissement augmente le 
taux de croissance du nombre de chercheurs employés dans les entreprises. 
 
Mots-Clés : crédit d’impôt, évaluation, recherche et développement 
Classement JEL : H25, O32, O38 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We study, at the firm level, whether the incremental R&D tax credit increases the private 
funding of 
R&D. In order to answer this question, we use the yearly surveys of the Ministry of Research 
over the period 1993-2003, as well as the corresponding firm-level tax files. The main issue is 
whether the firms would have increased their R&D expenditures without this tax incentive. We 
make use of the Rubin methodology. In a first step, we study the determinants of the 
probability to benefit from the R&D tax credit, that is the selection process at work in the 
recipients’ sample. We find that the probability to obtain a R&D tax credit increases with the 
R&D/Sales ratio and decreases with the direct R&D subsidies. Once we have evaluated the 
probability to get the R&D tax credit, we are able to correct for the selection bias. In a second 
step, we evaluate the effect of the incremental R&D tax credit on the private funding of 
research (once subtracted the direct subsidies from all the ministries). We find that, overall, 
the tax credit adds to the private funding of R&D: 1 Euro of tax credit would give slightly more 
than one Euro of total R&D. We also find that the incremental R&D tax credit increases the 
growth of the number of researchers. 
 
Keywords: tax credit, evaluation, research and development 
JEL Classification:  H25, O32, O38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
1 Introduction 
The many empirical studies that have been conducted in OECD countries over the past 
fifteen years show that research and development significantly improves the firms’ 
performances, however measured (Kleinknecht ed, 1996; Kleinknecht and Mohnen eds, 2002). 
The economic performance of a country therefore depends on its capacity to provide the right 
incentives to research and development (R&D) in the private sector. Unfortunately, R&D raises 
specific investment issues that do not always occur for physical investment. First, R&D creates 
information, and it cannot always be protected efficiently from competitors. Through imitation, 
some firms can get a part of the benefits of their competitors’ investments. Second, in some 
specific markets, the competition focuses on innovation itself more than on the organization of 
production. A firm that launches a new product gets a strategic advantage. Third, the output of 
research is naturally random. These three elements reduce the private incentives to perform 
research investments compared to physical investments. If no policy measure was to be taken, 
firms would show a tendency to under invest in R&D (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; 
Kamien, Muller and Zang, 1992). 
In order to achieve higher incentives for R&D, one needs to make this activity more 
profitable from the firms’ viewpoint. Two types of measures have been implemented: On the 
one hand, enforcing stronger property rights and, on the other hand, promoting financial support 
to R&D. The first type of measures relies on patents and brands. By forbidding imitators to get, 
freely, the benefits from the investments of innovators, the property rights aim to increase the 
gross return on R&D. This first array of policies is often not sufficient, because it is hard to 
apply property rights in some lines of business. Moreover, in order to protect themselves from 
imitation, the firms have to incur additional secrecy costs that reduce the return on R&D (Levin 
et al., 1987, Duguet and Kabla, 1998). The second type of measure is based on R&D subsidies 
and R&D tax credit. Their goal is to reduce the sunk cost of R&D. Compared to subsidies, the 
fiscal regulations present some advantages and one drawback. Among the advantages, fiscal 
incentives apply equally to all the firms whatever their line of business or their size are; they 
also let the initiative of the technological choices to the market, that is to the consumers of the 
new products; moreover, they reduce the administrative burden to fulfilling a simple form. The 
main drawback, compared to subsidies, is that there is no selection of the R&D projects by an 
independent institution. Therefore, there is a higher probability that firms that did not need any 
public support for their R&D projects apply for the R&D tax credit. In this last case, it is 
difficult to predict the effect of the tax credit on the private funding of R&D. 
 4 
 According to a recent study (Warda, 2006), the practice of R&D tax credit is expanding 
among the OECD countries, from 12 countries in 1996 to 19 countries in 2005. This expansion 
of fiscal deductions raises the additional issue of fiscal competition among countries, which 
could influence the location of the private R&D laboratories. Therefore, in addition to the 
classic issue of the private incentives for R&D, the expansion of R&D tax credit could also 
exert an influence over the location of the future knowledge production. 
In France, the R&D tax credit (« Crédit d’Impôt Recherche », CIR) was introduced in 1983. 
Until 2003, it was computed on the growth of R&D investments so that only firms with a 
steadily increasing R&D budget could benefit fully from it. This tax credit was equal to the half 
of R&D growth, and was refundable when the firms paid no taxes. Since 2004, this first tax 
credit has been completed by a “volume” tax credit, which is a tax credit computed on the 
amount of R&D regardless of the R&D growth. Up to 2005, the firms located in France have a 
right to a refundable R&D tax credit equal to the sum of 5% of their R&D total amount and to 
45% of their R&D growth. This policy direction has been extended in 2006 with 10% for the 
amount and 40% for the growth of R&D expenditures. It is noticeable that this “double-
deduction” system now exists in several countries, even though the eligible expenditures differ 
from one country to another, that the tax credit is not always refundable, and sometimes even 
taxable (in 9 countries out of 19). Out of 19 OECD countries with a R&D tax credit, 18 
countries apply a volume tax credit (the exception being the USA) and 8 countries apply a 
growth tax credit. Seven countries apply a “double-deduction” system but with different 
eligibility rules (Australia, Austria, France, Ireland, Korea, Portugal and Spain). 
This tax measures also involve a revenue loss for the State. It is quite difficult to make an 
international comparison on this variable. For France, averaged over the decade 1994-2003, the 
R&D tax credit represents 465 millions Euros a year. The extension to a volume tax credit in 
2004 almost doubled this figure, up to 890 millions Euros, and has strongly increased 
afterwards (1.5 billions Euros in 2006). For 2008, the incremental part of the tax credit has been 
suppressed and the firms can get 30% of their total expenditures, with an estimated cost of 4 
billions Euros. From the viewpoint of the society, these fiscal deductions are interesting only as 
far as they really increase the private R&D investments. The fact that they are taken on public 
funds (exactly like subsidies, from a public finance viewpoint) calls for the evaluation of this 
fiscal measures. This first motivation can be reinforced by noticing that, for France, its budget 
cost has considerably increased and, more generally, that these measures have been extended to 
larger number of innovating countries. 
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The public support to R&D faces the following evaluation problem. Two situations can 
occur when a tax credit is granted. On the one hand, a firm can integrate the tax credit into its 
investment decision process and decide to invest more because the deduction exists (i.e. because 
the price of R&D is lower with the tax deduction). But, on the other hand, it is possible that a 
firm does not account for this measure at the investment decision stage, realize afterwards that it 
has the right to a tax deduction, and asks for it in order to increase its profit. In the former case, 
the tax measure has the expected effect, while in the latter case it has no effect at all on private 
R&D. At the firm level, it is likely that both situations occur, therefore we wish to evaluate the 
average effect of the measure, in order to know whether the positive effects dominate or not. 
An important point when performing the evaluation is to consider a period with no policy 
change on the R&D tax credit at all. For this reason, we have restricted our data to 1993-2003, 
where the R&D tax credit is computed on the same eligible expenditures, on the growth of 
R&D, with a flat rate of 50%, refundable and not taxable.  
2 Data sources and sample statistics  
 
An interesting quality of our data set is that it includes true fiscal data at the firm level and 
not a theoretical computation of firms’ rights. It is important since all firms that could apply to 
the R&D tax credit do not apply for it in practice.2 This feature of the data allows to define a 
control group and to apply the Rubin methods explained below. This would not be possible 
without such data since a theoretical computation would allocate a tax credit to all firms with a 
R&D growth. Here, among firms with a positive R&D growth, we can separate firms that get a 
tax credit from the other firms. 
 
2.1 Data Sources 
 
The data comes from three different sources: 
- the « enquêtes annuelles d’entreprises » (yearly firm census) provide information on the 
accounting data (sales, line of business) ; 
                                                 
2 This fact is well known at the Ministry of Research and seems do derive from either a bad 
knowledge of tax deductions or from the erratic nature evolution of growth tax credit. The latter 
point is consistent with the fact that when the system was extended to the level of R&D in 2004, 
some firms entered the system for the first time, while they were performing R&D for a long 
time. 
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- The R&D survey is collected by the Ministry of Research and provides information at 
the firm level on R&D, and especially the amount of subsidies from all the ministries. Matching 
with this data set is important because it allows to correct the R&D amounts from subsidies and 
to determine the part of R&D expenditures that is privately funded; 
- The tax credit (CIR) file is collected by the fiscal administration (Direction Générale 
des Impôts). It is not a survey; it is exhaustive and includes the amount of tax credits granted at 
the firm level.3 It allows to perform a study on the real recipients of the tax credit and to remove 
the bias related to self-selection. 
We use the Frascati (OECD, 2002) definition of R&D provided by the R&D survey. Our 
main performance variable is computed from the private funding of R&D that we define as the 
difference between the total R&D expenditures on the one hand and the sum of all subsidies and 
tax credit on the other hand. It represents the amount of R&D actually paid by the firm. We also 
use data on R&D personnel in order to examine the robustness of our results. 
In order to evaluate the effect of the R&D tax credit on the growth rates of the private 
funding of R&D, we have matched our samples by couple of years over the period 1993-2003. 4 
This convention insures that there remain a large number of firms in the sample.5 After these 
operations, we have 10 samples covering the two-year periods 1994-1993 to 2003-2002. A 
description of the samples is provided in Table 1. The samples include between 1133 and 1645 
firms each year, in all lines of business (including services). Approximately 20% of the firms 
benefit from the tax credit alone or from a subsidy only and 7% benefit from both a subsidy and 
the tax credit. Over the decade, between 50% and 60% of the firms have benefited neither from 
a subsidy nor from a tax credit.6 This point is important because the evaluation relies on a 
comparison between the recipients and the other firms. In the evaluation literature, the non-
recipients represent the reservoir from which we extract the counterfactuals (Rubin, 2006). The 
size of this reservoir seems reasonable. 
The amounts of public supports to private R&D are reported in Table 2. As expected, the 
R&D subsidies represent the most important amounts, while the R&D tax credit reach 10% of 
the support given to firms. This is related to its incremental nature. However, it is important to 
                                                 
3 Another property of this data set is that it cannot be accessed by the standard procedure in 
France. The data were made available because there is a law that compels to provide an 
evaluation of the R&D tax credit to the Parliament. Access to the data set was decided after a 
call for offer on the tax credit evaluation among economic research laboratories. 
4
 The French firms have a compulsory identification number (the SIREN number) that is available in all 
our files. This precludes losses due to matching. 
5
 A balanced sample over the period would reduce to about 200 firms only, instead of 1500. 
6
 The effect of subsidies has been studied separately in Duguet (2004) with comparable evaluation 
methods. 
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keep in mind that these are not the same firms that get these two kinds of public support. The 
R&D tax credit, by its fiscal nature, is open to all the firms. It is often argued that the firms do 
not have the same size depending on they benefit from subsidies or from the tax credit. Figure 1 
shows the median size of the recipients depending on the R&D support that has been granted. 
Figure 2 present the corresponding average size. We find that while the median size does not 
differ between the two R&D mechanisms (a median of about 300 employees), there is a strong 
difference in the average size. The difference between these two measures comes from the 
biggest firms that are more present among the subsidy recipients. 
 The average size is around 500 employees for the tax credit recipient and around 2500 
employees for the subsidy recipient. A part of this difference can be attributed to the fact that, 
over this period, the tax credit is computed on the growth of R&D, and that the higher the level 
of R&D the harder it is to make it grow. The comparison of these two figures also confirms that 
the tax credit is more favorable to the small and medium sized firms. 
 
Figure 1 – Median number of workers depending on 
the R&D support mechanism 
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Figure 2 – Average number of workers depending on 
the R&D support mechanism 
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R&D, in order to assess the descriptive effect of the tax credit. Two types of comparisons can be 
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depending on the mechanism of the recipients benefit from. A second comparison, “dynamic”, 
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entry into the tax credit and exit from the tax credit mechanism. 
The static comparison is presented in Table 3. We find, as expected, that the firms that 
benefit from the tax credit have the strongest growth rate, partly because it is attributed on that 
basis (and not fully, because subsidies are deducted from the eligible R&D). Then come the 
firms that got both the tax credit and the subsidies. The lowest growth rates have been achieved 
by the firms that received subsidies alone and the firms that benefited no support. 
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growth rate for the private R&D variable means that the R&D tax credit would be efficient since 
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it involves that the firms have not reduced their private R&D when they have benefited from the 
tax credit. In this case, the total R&D expenditures increases by the amount of tax credit 
granted. When the effect is positive, there is a multiplier effect, the total R&D increases by 
more than the amount of tax credit granted. 
However, this first comparison suffers from a serious limitation. It does not allow seeing the 
effect of the tax deduction since what really matters is how the firms change their behavior 
when they get the public support. It is why we insist on the dynamic comparison. 
The dynamic comparison is performed in Table 4. Here we examine how the growth rate of 
private R&D is affected when the firms enter or exit the tax credit mechanism. The variation of 
the growth rates should be a better proxy for the R&D tax credit than their levels, even though 
we are conscious that there remains a selection bias issue. An incentive effect of the measure 
would involve that the private R&D does not decrease when a firms enters the mechanism. 
The dynamic comparison shows that the firms that enter the tax credit mechanism maintain a 
significant growth rate of their private R&D expenditures, which is often above 10%. The firms 
that enter in or exit from the mechanism do not behave significantly differently from the non 
recipients.  Overall, we find that the firms add exactly the tax credit to their private funding 
when they enter the mechanism, and add more than the tax credit to their private funding when 
they stay inside the mechanism. 
 
2.3 The “naïve” estimator and a critic of sample statistics 
 
The “naïve” estimator is defined as the difference of means. Its definition comes from the 
fact that this estimator is the one we should use on experimental data. The result is clear-cut: 
over all the decade the firms that have benefited from the R&D tax credit had a stronger growth 
rate of their R&D tax credit, except in 2000-2001 which corresponds to the burst of the dot-com 
bubble.  
In practice, R&D data are not experimental and are affected by selection biases. The firms 
that get the R&D tax credit do not have the same characteristics that the firms that get it, and if 
these unbalanced characteristics are correlated to our performance variable, we should expect a 
bias when comparing the mean performances of the recipients to the mean performance of the 
non-recipients. This difference is given in Table 5. 
Another critic is related to the type of tax credit that is given: when the tax credit is 
computed on the growth of R&D, the firms that do not experience a growth of their R&D are 
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not eligible to the tax credit. Therefore comparing the recipients with all the non-recipients is 
less relevant. Indeed what we would like to measure is the difference the R&D investment the 
firms have made and the R&D investment they would have made without the policy measure. 
For this, we need a counterfactual computed on the firms that did not benefit from the policy 
measure but the right counterfactual set seems to be the set of firms that have experienced a 
growth of their R&D expenditures and did not ask for the tax credit.7 In this paper, we will 
account for that critic by reporting the results restricted to the firms with a positive growth of 
R&D.8 
3 Methodology 
 
In order to measure the effect of CIR, one should evaluate the difference between the 
performance that a firm achieved with the CIR and the performance the same firms would have 
achieved without this mechanism. The latter quantity is called the counterfactual. There are 
many ways to estimate a counterfactual. In this paper, we consider two families of methods: 
standard regression analysis and matching methods. Among the latter we distinguish kernel 
matching and the weighted estimator. 
Let i,1y  the performance (i.e., the growth rate of private R&D) of firm i when it benefits 
from CIR and i,0y  its performance when it does not.  The evaluation problem comes from the 
fact that we cannot observe both quantities at the same time. Either we observe i1y  when the 
firm benefits from CIR or we observe i0y  when it does not. The observable data is therefore: 
( ) i1ii0ii yTyT1y +−=  with  



=
otherwise0
CIRfrombenefitsifirmif1
Ti  
 
3.1 Regression methods 
 
The simplest method is the naïve estimator that takes the difference of the average 
performance of recipients and non-recipients. Technically this reduces to perform an OLS 
regression of the performance on the intercept and a CIR dummy variable (equal to 1 for 
                                                 
7
 The lack of information and the fear of a fiscal control are often used to explain such behavior. 
8
 This critic also raises an issue when the data comes from the “innovation surveys”. The fiscal deduction 
dummy variable should be merged with R&D growth data in order to get the right counterfactual when 
the tax credit is defined on the growth of R&D. 
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recipients, 0 for the other firms). The OLS coefficient of the CIR dummy variables gives the 
difference of the mean performances in both groups: 
∑∑
∈∈
−=
01 Ii
i
0Ii
i
1
y
N
1y
N
1
cˆ
 
where 1I  is the index set of recipients (number: 1N ), and 0I the index set of non-recipients 
(number 0N ).This is the « naive » estimator.  
A second method extends the previous model by adding explanative variables iX  into the 
previous regression. The model becomes: 
iiii uTcbXay +++= . 
where iu  is the usual disturbance. From this model, we get the two cases: 
0Ti = , with an expected average performance ( ) ,bXa0TyE iii +==   
and 1Ti = , with an expected average performance ( ) cbXa1TyE iii ++==  
This implies that the effect of CIR for the individual i is equal to: 
( ) ( ) c0TyE1TyE iiii ==−= . 
Compared with the naïve estimator, this regression allows dropping from the evaluation the 
part that is attributable to the explanative variables iX .  
But, strictly speaking, the previous estimators are not fully consistent with the evaluation 
problematic. A third regression method is more rigorous. We assume that there are two 
equations corresponding to each of the potential outcome, so that: 
i00i0i0 ubXay ++=  and i11i1i1 ubXay ++= , 
And the observable performance is: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )i11i1ii00i0ii1ii0ii ubXaTubXaT1yTyT1y +++++−=+−= , 
After some simplification, we get: 
i3ii2i1i0i uXTTXy +β+β+β+β= , 
which implies that one should estimate a model with the cross product of the explanative 
variables and the CIR dummy. Moreover, if the variables iX  are centered, we can show that the 
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coefficient of the CIR dummy, 2β , measures the average effect of the tax credit on the 
performance.9 
The results produced with the standard regression methods are presented in Table 6.  The 
simple OLS regression method, depending on the year, give results that vary between no effect 
of the CIR on private R&D (in 2000-2001) and an important effect of +11,4%. The effects are 
globally lower than the ones obtained with the naïve estimator (up to +12.2%), which shows 
that the explanative variables explain a part of the growth difference between the recipients and 
the non-recipients. When we include the cross products of the explanative variables with the 
CIR dummy we get an effect that varies, depending on the year, between 0 and +10.4%, which 
shows that the cross product themselves explain a part of the performance differences between 
the recipients and the other firms.  
Overall, the growth rate gap of private R&D remains in favor of the CIR recipients. The 
standard OLS regression fails to control for all the differences between these two groups of 
firms. 
Qualitatively, these first results indicate that the effect of CIR would vary between a simple 
addition effect of CIR and private R&D (so that the measure is just efficient), and a multiplier 
effect of CIR on private R&D (so that firms would increase their R&D expenditures by more 
than the amount of the CIR). But it is well known the regression estimators can suffer from 
selection biases, therefore we turn to the matching methods. 
 
3.2 Methods that account for the selection bias 
 
The “evaluation methods” are the most important in this paper since the naive regression 
methods do not account for the fact that the individuals are not comparable in the recipient and 
the non recipient groups. We follow the propensity score approach initiated by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983, 1985) and surveyed in Lee (2005) and Rubin (2006). We aim to estimate the three 
following parameters: 
( )0 1 y -yE  c = , the average effect of the treatment,  
                                                 
9 The structure of this model also implies that the disturbance of the model is heteroskedastic 
since the disturbance is different depending on 0Ti = or 1Ti = . We account for this property in 
our estimations. 
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( )1T|y - yE  c 011 == , the average effect of the treatment on the treated; 
( )0T|y - yE  c 010 == , the average effect of the treatment on the not treated. 
These three quantities are related by the following relationship: 
0]Pr[T c  1]Pr[T c  c 01 =+== . 
Following Rubin (1974) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985), we make the conditional 
independence assumption: 
( ) ( ) ( )X1TPTy,yXTy,y 1010 =⊥⇒⊥  
The intuition of this result is the following: if two firms have the same probability to get the 
CIR, and the first firm does have it while the other has not, then the allocation of CIR can be 
considered as random between these two firms, and we can use the second firm as a 
counterfactual for the first firm.  
Estimation of the average effect on the treated c1. We consider the CIR recipients and, for 
each of them, we estimate the performance they would have had without the CIR. In practice, 
we compare the performance of the CIR recipient with the average performance of the non 
recipients that have the same probability to get the CIR. In this paper, we use the method of 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998). The average performance that the CIR recipients ( 1Ii ∈ ) 
would have had without the CIR is estimated by: 
[ ]
[ ] 1Ij
Ij
ij
jij
i,0 Ii,h/)pˆpˆ(K
yh/)pˆpˆ(K
yˆ
0
0
∈
−
×−
= ∑ ∑∈
∈
 
Where K(.) is a Gaussian kernel, h the rule-of-thumb window and ipˆ  the estimated 
probability to get the CIR for the firm i. Symmetrically, the performance that the non recipients 
( 0Ii ∈ ) would have had if they had benefited from CIR is estimated by: 
[ ]
[ ] 0Ij
Ij
ij
jij
i,1 Ii,h/)pˆpˆ(K
yh/)pˆpˆ(K
yˆ
1
1
∈
−
×−
= ∑ ∑∈
∈
, 
Therefore, the average effect of CIR on the treated is defined as: 
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{ }∑
∈
−=
1Ii
i,0i,1
1
1 yˆyN
1
cˆ , 
the average effect on the not treated by: 
{ }∑
∈
−=
0Ii
i,0i,1
0
0 yyˆN
1
cˆ , 
and the average effect on the whole population by: 
{ } { }








−+−
+
= ∑∑
∈∈ 10 Ii
i,0i,1
Ii
i,0i,1
10
yˆyyyˆ
NN
1
cˆ . 
The standard errors of these statistics are complicated to write, so that we use the bootstrap 
method with 1500 repetitions (including the Probit step for ipˆ ). 
The weighting approach, surveyed in Lee (2005), uses the same assumptions than kernel 
matching, but merely expresses the non observable sample moments by their observable 
counterparts, and replaces them by the corresponding empirical moments. We get the following 
results: 
Effect of the treatment on the not treated: 
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Effect of the treatment on the treated: 
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Effect of the treatment on the whole population: 
( )∑
=
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−
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N
1i ii
ii
i pˆ1pˆ
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cˆ  
Where ipˆ  is the estimated value of the propensity score for the individual i, N the number of 
firms in the common support, 0N  the number of not treated firms in the common support and 
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1N  the corresponding number of treated firms. The variances of theses estimators must be 
corrected to account for the estimation of the Probit model in the first step, but it can be 
determined by the delta method. The details are given in appendix. 
It is possible that the regression methods give inconsistent estimators because the CIR is not 
distributed at random to the firms. As for all policy measures, there are attribution procedures 
that determine who is eligible. This creates differences between the sample of recipients and the 
other firms and, provided that these differences are correlated with the performance measure, 
the OLS regression estimates can be inconsistent. It is therefore desirable to “balance” the 
covariates so that the firms are comparable. In practice, this creates an incentive to match each 
recipient firm to the non-recipient firms that share the same value of the observable covariates. 
There are many matching methods in the literature. In this paper, we follow the approach by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985), and match our firms on the propensity score, which is 
simply the probability to get the CIR. 
The intuition of this theoretical result is the following: if two firms have the same probability 
to get the CIR, that the first one got it and the second one did not, everything happens as if the 
CIR was allocated at random among these two firms. Therefore, for each recipient, we look for 
all the non-recipients that have the same probability to get the CIR and then we compute the 
difference between the performance of the recipient and the average performance of the other 
firms (the counterfactual). These operations are performed for all the recipients, and the effect 
of CIR is given by the average of all these differences (i.e., the “effect on the treated”). 
The same method can be used to determine the potential effect of CIR on the firms that did 
not get it. One just needs to match each non-recipient firm with the recipients that have the same 
probability to get the CIR.  
The only problem that remains is therefore to estimate the probability to get the CIR. We 
estimate a Probit model and use the predicted probabilities.10 Notice that the replacement of the 
true probabilities by the estimated probabilities implies to modify the way to compute the 
Student statistics. We have used the bootstrapped Student statistics to account for it. The last 
point is to make sure that the probabilities between the recipients and the non-recipients have a 
                                                 
10
 We have performed Vuong test of the Probit model against the Logit model. We find that the models 
are equivalent for all the couples of years, except for 2000-2001 were the Probit model outperforms the 
Logit model. Therefore, we kept the Probit model for all our regressions. 
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sufficient overlap so that we compare firms with similar probabilities. We have used the 
common support of the predicted probabilities to fix this problem. 11 
Last, notice that this method is related to the instrumental variable method in the following 
way. The estimation relies on the estimated probabilities to get the CIR, and these estimated 
probabilities depend on instrumental variables only (mostly lagged variables in our application). 
In our application, we have applied three different estimation methods on the common 
support of the CIR probabilities: 
- the OLS regression methods, so as to see what is the influence of changing the data set by 
dropping the extreme probabilities; 
- The kernel matching method (Rubin approach). It allows for distinguishing the effect on 
the treated from the effect of the non-treated; 
- The weighted estimator (or “moment estimator”), which is equivalent to kernel matching 
but much faster to compute since it replaces the bootstrap method by the delta method (see the 
appendix). 
The Rubin methodology implies to drop some observations from the sample when the 
probabilities take extreme values (close to 0 or to 1). The estimations are performed on the 
common support of the estimated CIR probabilities. Therefore, if we wish to compare this 
method with the OLS regression methods, we should do it on the same sample, on the common 
support, so as to make sure that the differences comes from the method itself and not from a 
sample difference only. 
Table 7 presents the OLS regression methods on the common support. We do not find 
important differences with the regressions over the whole sample, so that the difference of 
samples cannot be advocated to explain difference of results among the standard and Rubin 
methods. 
 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
 
A problem specific to the tax credit systems computed on the growth of R&D comes from 
the fact that our performance variable is correlated to the attribution conditions. Therefore we 
cannot use the standard method without caution. There are two ways to tackle that problem: 
                                                 
11 In practice, we define the probability support by the first and 99th percentiles in order to 
suppress the influence of outliers. 
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- First, one can restrict the analysis to the firms that have a positive growth rate of their 
R&D. This is because only these firms are eligible and it should improve on the quality of the 
matching. This is only possible however because some firms that have the right to the tax credit 
do not ask for it.  
- Second, one can use another variable than the growth rate of R&D. We need a variable that 
is both related to the R&D effort and not to a “short-run” effect caused by the CIR. We use the 
growth rate of the (full-time) number of researchers. Indeed, the researchers are the ones that 
hold the knowledge of the firm, so that the firms should be reluctant to hire or lay-off 
researchers just to benefit from a short-run tax deduction. The number of researchers is an 
essential input of the innovation process so that is should be a good indicator of the “real” 
innovation policy of the firm. Keeping the researchers inside the firm avoids the dissemination 
of knowledge to competitors and many studies show that the firms care about this issue (Levin 
et al., 1987, Duguet and Kabla, 1998).  
We have also tried instrumental variables methods (not reported) but their results were 
similar to those of the standard regression methods, and often gave a stronger effect of CIR on 
the growth of private R&D. 
In order to measure the effect of CIR on private R&D, we use the following empirical 
strategy: 
- Estimators over the whole sample; 
- Estimators restricted to the firms with a positive growth rate of private R&D; 
- Estimators on the growth rate of the number of researchers. 
 
3.4 Multipliers computation 
There are two ways to compute the tax credit multipliers in the literature: first, one divides 
the tax credit amount by the amount of R&D the firms would have made without it (impact of 
the tax credit on R&D); second, one divides the incremental amount of R&D performed under 
the tax credit by the amount of tax credit distributed (additional number of Euros of R&D for 
one Euro of tax credit distributed). This section writes the explicit relationships between our 
estimates and these two kinds of multipliers. We need the following notations: 
- 1c  denotes the effect on the treated; 
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- 0R  is the amount of R&D that would have been invested without the CIR and 1R is the 
amount of R&D that would have been invested under the tax credit. 
- We have the following relationship between these quantities: 
( ) 011
0
01
1 Rc1RR
RR
c +=⇔
−
= . 
- “R” denotes the private R&D expenditures. 
- The R&D subsidies have been subtracted from all our measures of R&D (private and total) 
so that we really measure the net effect of the tax credit on R&D. 
 
3.4.1 R&D expenditures multipliers 
All our multipliers are computed on the subset of CIR recipient firms, since there is no direct 
effect on the others by definition. This is a significant difference with aggregated data where 
total R&D usually refers to country R&D and therefore includes the non recipients.  
Private R&D expenditures multiplier 
Consider first the private R&D multiplier. With the tax credit, a firm invests 1R  while 
without it, the same firm would have invested ( )110 c1/RR += , therefore the private R&D 
multiplier is equal to: 
1
1
1
1
P c1
c1
R
R
m +=






+
= , 
Total R&D expenditures multiplier 
Consider now the total R&D multiplier. The total R&D of a recipient firm is equal to 
CIRR1 +  under the tax credit, while it is ( )110 c1/RR +=  without it. The total R&D 
multiplier is therefore equal to: 
( )( )11
1
1
1
T R/CIR1c1
c1
R
CIRR
m ++=
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




+
+
= , 
In this paper, we present the mean value of this multiplier over the sample, which gives: 
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( )( )11T R/CIR1c1m ++=  
 
3.4.2 Tax credit multipliers 
Private R&D tax credit multiplier 
The variation of private R&D induces by CIR is equal to: 
,R
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c
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RRRR 1
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−=−  
so that the multiplier equals: 
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=  . 
We estimate it at the mean point of the sample by: 
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Total R&D tax credit multiplier 
The variation of total R&D induced by the CIR is equal to: 
CIRR
c1
cRCIRR 1
1
1
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+
=−+  
So that the multiplier equals: 
P
01
T M1CIR
RRCIR
M +=
−+
= . 
 
4 Results 
In a first subsection, we report the determinants of the probability to get the CIR and, in a 
second subsection, we comment on the evaluation.  
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4.1 The probability to get CIR 
 
The main determinant of CIR is its lagged value (Table 8). This result illustrates the 
importance of the dynamic comparison reported in Table 4.  But other variables also influence 
the probability to get the CIR: the R&D/sales ratio increases the probability to get the tax credit 
and the benefit from R&D subsidies reduces it. In the latter case, there could be a mechanical 
effect coming from the fact that the R&D subsidies are not eligible to the tax credit. Finally, we 
also find that some lines of business use more the tax credit on some years, but we do not find 
time persistence on this point. This could come from the fact that the tax credit is more open to 
firms than R&D subsidies. 
A second interesting result is the small number of significant explanative variables in the 
Probit regressions. This also suggests that entry into the tax credit mechanism is more open than 
for R&D subsidies (Duguet, 2004). In order to test the robustness of this result, we have also 
run the Probit regressions without the lagged tax credit variable (not reported). We find that the 
most important determinant of the probability to get the tax credit is the R&D/sales ratio. 
Therefore the R&D tax credit is directed toward the firms that allocate the biggest part of their 
sales to R&D. This selection of recipients certainly explains for a good part, the results of the 
evaluations that follow. 
 
4.2 The effect of CIR  
 
The kernel matching and weighting methods provide similar results (Table 9). We comment 
mostly on the weighting estimators because they provide smaller standard errors. 
The estimation on the recipients represents the evaluation strictly speaking (the « effect on 
the treated »): we seek to estimate the effect of the tax credit on the firms that have indeed 
benefited from it, and not on the whole sample of R&D performers. The basic results show a 
multiplier effect on 6 years out of 10, and an addition effect for the 4 remaining years. 
The estimation on the sample of firms that have not benefited from the tax credit represents 
the effect the CIR would have had if it has been extended to more R&D firms. We find that the 
potential effect of the tax credit on this subsample of firms is weaker than on the recipients since 
we find a multiplier effect for 1 year and an addition effect on 9 years. However, we do not find 
a (firm-level) « crowding-out » effect. 
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However, these first estimates must be taken with caution. Since the tax credit is 
incremental, we could think that the standard evaluation procedure overestimates the effect of 
CIR on the growth rate of private R&D. Therefore, we also present the estimation, with the 
same methodology, on the subsample of firms that had a positive growth rate of their private 
R&D and, despite of this, did not ask for CIR. The results, reported in Table 10, should 
represent a lower bound of the effect of the tax credit. This « lower bound » shows an addition 
effect for all the 10 years. According to it, the firms would add the tax credit to their private 
funding so that there would be no « crowding out » effect. 
It is possible to convert the results reported in Tables 10 and 11 into multipliers of the total 
R&D expenditures. Since the study is performed over ten couple of years, we comment on the 
average value (Tables 11 and 12). 
The estimations based on the total sample (Table 10) indicate that the CIR would have 
increased private R&D by 7.9% (Table 11, multiplier 1.079) and total R&D (with the CIR) by 
11.2%. The effect would thus be important on the recipients. When we restrict the analysis to 
the firms that have increased their private R&D (Table 11), the corresponding effects would be 
between 0% (unit multiplier), a simple addition effect, and the total R&D would have increased 
by 3.2% only.  
A common practice expresses the multipliers as a function of CIR itself. Over the whole 
sample (Table 10) we find that 1 Euro of CIR would generate 2.33 Euros of private R&D that is 
3.33 (=1+2.33) Euros of total R&D (Table 12). When we restrict the analysis to the positive 
growth rates (Table 12) we find a more pessimistic result that 1 Euro of CIR would not generate 
any Euro of private R&D, so that 1 Euro of CIR would generate 1 Euro of total R&D. However, 
since our evaluation is a short-run one (one year), this figure is in fact rather high. 
 
4.3 Testing the robustness of our estimators: the number of researchers 
 
A basic reason that may reduce the trust that we have in the previous estimates is the 
incremental nature of the R&D tax credit. We reply to this critic by proposing the following 
robustness test. The R&D performers may have an interest in asking for tax deductions even 
when they do not need it, but the same R&D performers have no interest in letting their 
knowledge leak out for free to their competitors. Therefore, if they do not use the R&D tax 
credit for research, we should see no R&D personnel variations. We use growth rate of the 
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number of researchers, in equivalent full time, since they are the holders of the firm’s 
knowledge. The results are reported in Table 13. 
We find that, over the whole population, the R&D tax credit is always associated to positive 
growth of the number of researchers, varying between 7.5% and 12.6% depending on the couple 
of years. If we restrict our analysis to the firms that had a positive growth rate of their private 
R&D, we find a positive effect 5 years out of 10 (from 6.6% to 10%) and no effect on five 
years. These results suggest that the R&D performers would use the incremental R&D tax credit 
in order to invest in R&D. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
We find that the incremental R&D tax credit benefits to a different population of firms than the 
ones that benefit from subsidies. The tax credit recipients have a smaller size and a high R&D to 
Sales ratio. This confirms the view that the tax measures favor equality among the innovative 
firms. 
Applying methods that control for selection biases, we find that the incremental R&D tax 
incentive is effective, since it is associated both to a growth of the private funding of R&D (or 
adds to it), and to a growth of the number of researchers on most years. 
However, the results in this study apply to the incremental tax credit only, which is based on the 
growth of the privately funded R&D. It does not seem to be extendable to other form of tax 
mechanism, since they apply to a different population of firms (larger, especially). New research 
should be done in order to evaluate the reforms that have been taken place in France since 2004. 
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Appendix: Estimation of the variance of the weighting estimators 
 
Slightly extending the analysis in Crépon and Iung (1999), we write the three estimators 
under the following form: 
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where bˆ  is the estimated parameter from the Probit model. Using the delta method, we 
can estimate the variance of our estimate by: 
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Notice that these formulas are valid for any binary model estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method, provided that one replaces ( )bX iΦ Φ  by ( )bXF1 i−−  where F(.) is the cdf 
of the disturbance of the new model (or by ( )bXF i  if the distribution is symmetric). 
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Table 1: Public Support to Private R&D 
 
Year Subsidy Alone 
Tax Credit 
Alone 
Both 
Subsidy 
and Tax 
Credit 
No Public 
Support Sample size 
1994 21,1% 19,5% 8,6% 50,9% 1553 (100%) 
1995 19,1% 18,4% 7,4% 55,1% 1645 (100%) 
1996 19,5% 16,7% 7,0% 56,9% 1639 (100%) 
1997 18,8% 17,3% 6,1% 57,9% 1570 (100%) 
1998 20,1% 17,2% 6,3% 56,3% 1482 (100%) 
1999 20,1% 17,2% 7,1% 55,5% 1491 (100%) 
2000 20,0% 17,6% 8,5% 53,9% 1213 (100%) 
2001 16,8% 19,1% 7,9% 56,2% 1133 (100%) 
2002 17,0% 18,3% 6,5% 58,1% 1299 (100%) 
2003 17,6% 16,7% 5,8% 59,8% 1542 (100%) 
 
Table 2: Amount of Public Support to R&D 
 
Year Subsidies Tax Credit Total* 
1994 94,8% 5,2% 2 292 (100%) 
1995 92,5% 7,5% 2 045 (100%) 
1996 92,0% 8,0% 1 542 (100%) 
1997 90,2% 9,8% 1 253 (100%) 
1998 88,4% 11,6% 1 207 (100%) 
1999 91,1% 8,9% 2 083 (100%) 
2000 93,1% 6,9% 1 727 (100%) 
2001 87,7% 12,3% 1 573 (100%) 
2002 90,5% 9,5% 1 901 (100%) 
2003 90,3% 9,7% 1 194 (100%) 
Notes *In millions Euros, computed on the sample 
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Table 3: Static comparison of the growth rates of the private funding of R&D 
* Significant at the 5% level 
  Subsidy Tax Credit (CIR) Both None 
1993-1994 Average -11,5% -6,3% 0,9% -18,3% 
 Student 4,99* 3,07* 0,29 12,71* 
1994-1995 Average 3,2% 11,6% 9,1% 2,9% 
 Student 1,72 6,46* 3,31* 2,91* 
1995-1996 Average 0,6% 6,8% 3,3% 1,1% 
 Student 0,31 3,54* 1,15 1,05 
1996-1997 Average -1,6% 9,7% 7,2% 2,3% 
 Student 0,89 5,19* 2,31* 2,34* 
1997-1998 Average 1,6% 10,3% 2,4% 1,0% 
 Student 0,83 5,53* 0,65 0,93 
1998-1999 Average -2,1% 10,5% 8,6% 0,2% 
 Student 0,84 4,21* 1,83 0,13 
1999-2000 Average -0,3% 6,9% 3,1% -1,1% 
 Student 0,12 2,84* 0,68 0,74 
2000-2001 Average 6,5% 6,6% 8,1% 3,9% 
 Student 2,15* 2,58* 2,18* 2,11* 
2001-2002 Average 0,0% 11,5% 1,0% -1,4% 
 Student 0,00 5,24* 0,22 0,92 
2002-2003 Average -2,6% 8,1% -1,2% -1,8% 
 Student 0,88 3,28* 0,32 1,32 
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Table 4: Dynamic comparison of the growth rates of private R&D 
 
** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
(Tax credit in t-1, Tax credit in t) 
Growth rates 
Entry inside the tax credit 
mechanism 
Difference of growth rates 
Exit from the tax credit 
mechanism 
Difference of growth 
rates 
 
(Out, 
Out) (Out, In) (In, Out) (In, In) 
(Out,In)-
(Out,Out) Student 
(In,In)-
(In,Out) Student 
(1993,1994) -0,162 -0,131 -0,168 -0,015 0,032 0,77 0,154 4,27** 
(1994,1995) 0,028 0,079 0,042 0,119 0,051 1,56 0,077 2,43** 
(1995,1996) 0,010 0,054 0,006 0,059 0,044 1,16 0,054 1,60 
(1996,1997) 0,010 0,026 0,040 0,118 0,016 0,52 0,078 2,40** 
(1997,1998) 0,009 0,032 0,032 0,103 0,023 0,64 0,070 1,82* 
(1998,1999) -0,004 -0,004 -0,006 0,164 0,000 0,01 0,170 4,32** 
(1999,2000) -0,015 -0,012 0,040 0,088 0,004 0,10 0,048 1,03 
(2000,2001) 0,047 0,003 0,030 0,098 -0,043 1,12 0,068 1,39 
(2001,2002) -0,012 0,010 -0,001 0,122 0,022 0,55 0,123 3,08** 
(2002,2003) -0,018 -0,006 -0,036 0,085 0,012 0,31 0,120 2,65** 
 
Table 5: Global comparison of the average growth rates  
of the private funding of R&D 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
 
Tax credit 
recipient 
Non 
recipient Difference Student 
1993-1994 -0,041 -0,163 0,122 5,80* 
1994-1995 0,108 0,030 0,079 4,52* 
1995-1996 0,058 0,010 0,048 2,60* 
1996-1997 0,090 0,013 0,077 4,22* 
1997-1998 0,081 0,012 0,070 3,59* 
1998-1999 0,099 -0,004 0,104 4,10* 
1999-2000 0,056 -0,009 0,065 2,53* 
2000-2001 0,070 0,045 0,025 0,97 
2001-2002 0,087 -0,011 0,098 4,07* 
2002-2003 0,057 -0,020 0,077 3,14* 
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Table 6: Regression methods 
 
All the explanative variables are lagged one year. The left-hand variable is the growth rate of the private funding of R&D. The explanative variables are: log of the private funding of 
R&D, log of sales, log of total R&D to sales ratio, export dummy, export rate, 2-digit activity dummy. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. The coefficient presented is 
the one of the CIR dummy. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 1994-1993 1995-1994 1996-1995 1997-1996 1998-1997 1999-1998 2000-1999 2001-2000 2002-2001 2003-2002 
 Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
Naive 
estimator 
(Table  5) 
0,122 5,80** 0,079 4,53** 0,048 2,60** 0,077 4,23** 0,070 3,59** 0,104 4,11** 0,065 2,53** 0,025 0,97 0,098 4,07** 0,077 3,14** 
OLS  0,114 5,39** 0,086 5,00** 0,051 2,75** 0,079 4,42** 0,074 3,83** 0,101 4,04** 0,058 2,25** 0,030 1,17 0,100 4,24** 0,068 2,82** 
OLS with 
cross products 0,104 4,73** 0,084 4,71** 0,048 2,53** 0,066 3,67** 0,075 3,81** 0,088 3,28** 0,054 2,00** 0,039 1,55 0,105 4,39** 0,068 2,69** 
 
Table 7: Regression methods on the common support of the probabilities to get the CIR 
 
All the explanative variables are lagged one year. The left-hand variable is the growth rate of the private funding of R&D. The explanative variables are: log of the private funding of R&D, 
log of sales, log of total R&D to sales ratio, export dummy, export rate, 2-digit activity dummy. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. The coefficient presented is the one of 
the CIR dummy.  ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. 
 
1994-1993 1995-1994 1996-1995 1997-1996 1998-1997 1999-1998 2000-1999 2001-2000 2002-2001 2003-2002 
 
Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
Naïve estimator 0,123 5,57** 0,092 4,93** 0,050 2,56** 0,084 4,37** 0,065 3,25** 0,106 3,97** 0,071 2,69** 0,053 1,93* 0,112 4,61** 0,086 3,31** 
OLS 0,110 5,05** 0,089 4,90** 0,052 2,68** 0,078 4,09** 0,063 3,20** 0,099 3,77** 0,063 2,43** 0,040 1,48 0,113 4,73** 0,073 2,89** 
OLS with cross 
products 0,100 4,46** 0,085 4,59** 0,047 2,43** 0,067 3,50** 0,065 3,35** 0,086 3,14** 0,064 2,50** 0,040 1,58 0,112 4,70** 0,065 2,47** 
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Table 8: Probit estimates of the probability to benefit from CIR 
Left-hand variable: CIR benefit dummy (yes/no). All the right-hand variables are lagged one year. Maximum likelihood estimates of the Probit model. 
 1994-1993 1994-1993 1995-1994 1995-1994 1996-1995 1996-1995 1997-1996 1997-1996 1998-1997 1998-1997 
 Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
Intercept -0,80 2,39 -0,86 5,89 -1,08 3,10 -1,00 7,56 -1,06 3,11 -1,27 22,43 -0,97 2,68 -1,29 23,52 -1,41 3,66 -0,99 7,17 
Lagged CIR dummy 1,59 20,24 1,59 20,39 1,70 21,44 1,70 21,68 1,63 20,14 1,62 20,64 1,64 19,63 1,64 20,06 1,72 19,79 1,71 19,95 
log(Sales) -0,01 0,30   0,03 1,05   -0,01 0,18   -0,01 0,28   0,04 1,39   
log(total RD/sales) 0,06 1,32 0,07 1,98 0,11 2,76 0,09 2,84 0,01 0,36   0,05 1,20   0,13 2,96 0,10 2,81 
RD subsidy dummy 0,14 1,41   0,06 0,57   0,03 0,26   0,00 0,04   -0,05 0,43   
RD subsidy/Total RD -0,76 1,97 -0,52 1,56 -0,93 2,18 -0,80 2,16 -0,24 0,64   -0,68 1,52 -0,55 1,46 0,20 0,48   
Export dummy 0,05 0,33   -0,26 1,62   -0,07 0,44   0,12 0,69   0,04 0,23   
Exports/Sales -0,58 3,16 -0,58 3,43 -0,06 0,33   0,18 1,03   0,09 0,54   -0,15 0,88   
Food industry -0,10 0,45   0,06 0,26   -0,07 0,31   0,20 0,95 0,33 1,96 0,09 0,36   
Consumer goods -0,02 0,12   0,06 0,37   -0,02 0,12   -0,28 1,55   0,31 1,66 0,24 2,08 
Equipment goods -0,09 0,57   0,14 0,84   -0,16 1,03   -0,15 0,92   0,06 0,34   
Intermediate goods -0,15 0,99   0,23 1,48 0,15 1,76 -0,29 1,98 -0,19 2,25 -0,26 1,67   0,14 0,86   
Services -0,36 1,83 -0,27 1,87 -0,09 0,47   -0,17 0,91   -0,62 2,82 -0,39 2,41 0,04 0,18   
Other (incl.. car industry) Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  
 1999-1998 1999-1998 2000-1999 2000-1999 2001-2000 2001-2000 2002-2001 2002-2001 2003-2002 2003-2002 
 Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
Intercept -0,86 2,41 -1,11 3,83 -1,79 4,22 -1,64 5,26 -1,60 3,71 -1,73 5,36 -1,74 4,46 -1,83 6,12 -1,30 3,90 -1,32 23,97 
Lagged CIR dummy 1,39 16,59 1,40 17,00 1,65 17,82 1,65 17,92 1,70 17,74 1,69 17,75 1,57 17,61 1,56 17,94 1,62 19,31 1,63 19,60 
log(Sales) 0,04 1,51 0,04 1,81 0,05 1,56 0,05 1,64 0,09 2,78 0,08 2,76 0,05 1,61 0,05 1,98 0,03 1,06   
log(total RD/sales) 0,04 0,94   0,06 1,30 0,06 1,46 0,13 2,88 0,13 3,14 -0,02 0,44   0,07 1,89   
RD subsidy dummy -0,02 0,17   0,03 0,30   0,12 0,99   -0,11 0,93   -0,08 0,67   
RD subsidy/Total RD 0,15 0,42   0,11 0,30   -0,61 1,48   0,23 0,51   -0,27 0,61   
Export dummy -0,58 3,19 -0,60 3,45 0,28 1,21   -0,32 1,36   0,04 0,19   -0,03 0,16   
Exports/Sales 0,41 2,54 0,36 2,28 0,27 1,43 0,29 1,69 0,31 1,62 0,25 1,45 -0,01 0,08   -0,06 0,38   
Food industry 0,04 0,19   -0,06 0,23   0,21 0,77   -0,29 1,17   0,20 0,94   
Consumer goods -0,12 0,69   -0,24 1,22   0,08 0,39   -0,05 0,28   0,19 1,22 0,22 1,88 
Equipment goods -0,22 1,39   -0,17 0,94   0,12 0,63   -0,05 0,32   0,05 0,37   
Intermediate goods -0,38 2,56 -0,25 3,02 -0,09 0,51   -0,05 0,29 -0,16 1,59 -0,20 1,25   -0,07 0,47   
Services -0,14 0,69   0,07 0,31   0,06 0,25   -0,25 1,19   -0,35 1,81 -0,35 2,21 
Other (incl.. car industry) Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  Réf  
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Table 9: Evaluation estimators à la Rubin on the whole sample 
 
We use the Probit regressions reported in Table 8 for the matching and the weighting. In both cases we consider the firms belonging to the common support of the treatment probability. We 
report the effect of the CIR on the growth rate of the private funding of R&D. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%. 
 1994-1993 1995-1994 1996-1995 1997-1996 1998-1997 1999-1998 2000-1999 2001-2000 2002-2001 2003-2002 
 Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
 Weighting estimators 
Average effect on 
the population 0,069 2,40** 0,078 2,93** 0,049 1,58 0,040 1,57 0,055 1,79* 0,035 0,91 0,044 1,36 0,008 0,23 0,066 2,04** 0,054 1,75* 
Average effect on 
the not treated 0,043 1,30 0,074 2,41** 0,048 1,36 0,034 1,17 0,054 1,55 0,016 0,36 0,047 1,29 -0,009 0,22 0,053 1,44 0,042 1,24 
Average effect on 
the treated 0,140 4,60** 0,087 3,35** 0,051 1,88 0,062 2,46** 0,056 1,90* 0,099 3,17** 0,036 1,01 0,050 1,34 0,105 3,28** 0,097 2,93** 
 
Kernel matching estimators 
(The asymptotic Student t are computed by the bootstrap with 1500 repetitions, including the Probit step) 
Average effect on 
the population 0,080 2,58** 0,070 2,69** 0,051 1,61 0,037 1,41 0,039 1,32 0,041 1,13 0,020 0,57 0,013 0,37 0,063 1,93* 0,048 1,53 
Average effect on 
the not treated 0,061 1,71* 0,064 2,14** 0,049 1,37 0,028 0,96 0,035 1,05 0,024 0,60 0,017 0,44 -0,002 0,05 0,051 1,38 0,034 0,97 
Average effect on 
the treated 0,129 4,14** 0,087 3,32** 0,057 2,03** 0,068 2,56** 0,054 1,70 0,096 3,02** 0,028 0,75 0,050 1,29 0,101 3,04** 0,100 2,97** 
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Table 10: Evaluation estimators à la Rubin on the positive growth rates 
 
We use the Probit regressions reported in Table 8 for the matching and the weighting. In both cases we consider the firms belonging to the common support of the treatment probability. We 
report the effect of the CIR on the growth rate of the private funding of R&D.. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%. 
 1994-1993 1995-1994 1996-1995 1997-1996 1998-1997 1999-1998 2000-1999 2001-2000 2002-2001 2003-2002 
 Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
 Weighting estimators 
Average effect on 
the population -0,032 1,40 0,075 2,25** 0,014 0,64 0,048 1,71* 0,033 0,92 0,089 2,11** -0,043 1,60 -0,034 1,32 0,004 0,14 -0,028 1,17 
Average effect on 
the not treated -0,043 1,47 0,103 2,38** 0,025 0,93 0,052 1,54 0,057 1,29 0,104 1,98** -0,047 1,56 -0,050 1,68* 0,010 0,30 -0,039 1,48 
Average effect on 
the treated -0,014 0,62 0,016 0,56 -0,012 0,59 0,036 1,46 -0,026 0,90 0,055 1,64 -0,033 1,06 0,001 0,05 -0,011 0,36 0,004 0,14 
 
Kernel matching estimators 
(The asymptotic Student t are computed by the bootstrap with 1500 repetitions, including the Probit step) 
Average effect on 
the population -0,043 1,90* 0,042 1,46 0,020 0,85 0,032 1,28 0,026 0,85 0,065 1,87* -0,011 0,35 -0,040 1,47 0,015 0,52 -0,013 0,44 
Average effect on 
the not treated -0,054 2,02** 0,053 1,51 0,033 1,20 0,032 1,09 0,047 1,34 0,067 1,67* -0,011 0,30 -0,052 1,76* 0,010 0,30 -0,013 0,42 
Average effect on 
the treated -0,026 1,02 0,020 0,67 -0,012 0,52 0,033 1,27 -0,028 0,88 0,060 1,79* -0,011 0,33 -0,013 0,37 0,025 0,92 -0,011 0,29 
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Table 11: Multipliers according to the private R&D expenditures  
Average estimation over the period 1994-2003* 
 
 
 
Private 
R&D 
Lower 
bound 
95% 
Upper  
bound 
95% 
Total R&D 
expenditures 
Lower 
bound 
95% 
Upper bound 
95% 
Over the whole sample (Table 10): 
Weighting estimator 1,079 1,060 1,097 1,112 1,093 1,131 
Kernel matching estimator 1,078 1,059 1,098 1,112 1,092 1,131 
On the positive growth rates (Table 11) : 
Weighting estimator 1,000 0,983 1,017 1,032 1,015 1,050 
Kernel matching estimator 1,003 0,985 1,022 1,035 1,017 1,054 
*We use the weighted average of the effects over the period 1994-2003, where the (optimal) weight is equal to the 
inverse of each estimator’s variance.  
 
 
Table 12: Multipliers according to the amount of tax credit distributed  
Average estimation over the period 1994-2003* 
 
 
Private 
R&D 
Lower 
bound 
95% 
Upper  
bound 
95% 
Total R&D 
expenditures 
Lower 
bound 
95% 
Upper bound 
95% 
Over the whole sample (Table 10): 
Weighting estimator 2,327 1,774 2,881 3,327 2,774 3,881 
Kernel matching estimator 2,315 1,743 2,887 3,315 2,743 3,887 
On the positive growth rates (Table 11) : 
Weighting estimator 0,011 -0,503 0,525 1,011 0,497 1,525 
Kernel matching estimator 0,119 -0,436 0,675 1,119 0,564 1,675 
*We use the weighted average of the effects over the period 1994-2003, where the (optimal) weight is equal to the 
inverse of each estimator’s variance.
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Table 13: Effect of the R&D tax credit on the growth rate of the number of researchers  
 
We use the Probit regressions reported in Table 8 for the weighting estimator. The « performance variable » is the growth rate of the number of researchers (in full-time equivalent). We 
consider the firms belonging to the common support of the treatment probability. ** significant at 5%. *significant at 10%. 
 1994-1993 1995-1994 1996-1995 1997-1996 1998-1997 1999-1998 2000-1999 2001-2000 2002-2001 2003-2002 
 Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student Coeff Student 
 Over the whole sample 
Average effect on 
the population 0,105** 3,36 0,116** 4,13 0,088** 2,81 0,118** 3,54 0,061 1,87 0,112** 3,13 0,119** 2,63 0,082** 2,71 0,099** 2,90 0,102** 3,00 
Average effect on 
the not treated 0,099** 2,75 0,115** 3,61 0,078** 2,19 0,117** 3,08 0,045 1,24 0,107** 2,71 0,134** 2,52 0,082** 2,45 0,096** 2,56 0,100** 2,68 
Average effect on 
the treated 0,120** 3,78 0,121** 3,84 0,122** 3,79 0,123** 3,81 0,109** 3,08 0,126** 3,83 0,075** 2,00 0,084** 2,20 0,108** 2,89 0,109** 2,97 
 On the positive growth rates of private R&D 
Average effect on 
the population 0,008 0,19 0,098** 2,3 0,069* 1,73 0,075* 1,72 0,042 0,99 0,020 0,44 0,082 1,62 0,070* 1,80 0,081* 1,74 0,069* 1,70 
Average effect on 
the not treated 0,022 0,43 0,113** 2,18 0,071 1,46 0,073 1,41 0,032 0,61 0,008 0,14 0,103* 1,71 0,056 1,25 0,074 1,42 0,076* 1,72 
Average effect on 
the treated -0,015 0,39 0,069 1,49 0,066** 2,08 0,080** 2,32 0,068* 1,84 0,049 1,19 0,031 0,72 0,100** 2,07 0,100* 1,91 0,048 0,93 
 
 
